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Abstract 
Contemporary social science remains quite divided about the type of coordination that allows 
some groups of agents to carry out successful economic development and which distinguishes 
them from cases of failure.  In some cases, it is said to be traditional or non-market forms of 
coordination, such family, networks, or shared traditions: these are “communitarian” sources 
of organization. In most mainstream economics, however, the opposite is said to be necessary: 
anonymous and transparent rules of the market, property rights, and contracts.  These are 
“societal” forces.  For example, for some analysts, Silicon Valley is a case of community, 
while for others it is due to appropriate societal forces.  The same cleavage can be found in 
rival interpretations of the success of the Asian Tigers, the industrial clusters of the Third 
Italy, or any of a host of other cases.  A more robust explanation shows how both 
communitarian and societal forces act as checks and balances on one another, all the while 
each creating specific but different sources of efficiency in the economy.  This view is 
illustrated via a study in contrasts, between a failed case of low-technology economic 
development in the Brazilian Northeast, and a success story in the state of Jalisco, Mexico. 
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Lorenzon of the Copenhagen Business School for having arranged our interviews in Denmark. 
 1
I. CONTRASTS IN INNOVATION: WHY SHOULD LOW-TECH BE SO 
DIFFICULT? 
 
Tonalà, near Guadalajara in the state of Jalisco, Mexico,  provides the first-time visitor 
the impression of a typical Mexican town with narrow, cobbled streets and small adobe 
houses whose front rooms double as stores.  The town center is traditional Mexican plaza 
style. The streets are clean and well-cared for, with cheerful brightly-colored facades; every 
morning, each family cleans its sidewalks in front of its shop. Overall, there is a jumble of 
production, residential, and sales spaces. People are all around, with workers moving ceramic 
products while trucks almost too large for the narrow streets are crammed full of product, 
leaving to far-flung destinations to be sold in American and European chain stores.  Hundreds 
of stores line the streets, one after another, offering a wide array of  “typical Mexican” 
handicrafts.   On the  two big market days,2 people arrive from all over to buy ceramics, 
furniture, blown glass, and other decorative objects.  The work areas are low-tech and work is 
hard, but the overall feeling is of bustle but not oppression; this is not surprising, since many 
of the firms are family-owned and operated and in many, the owners are former workers in 
other firms. 
On the other side of the Guadalajara metropolitan area,  the main street of the town of  
Tlaquepaque is lined with magnificent colonial houses, the central plaza has a baroque 
cathedral, and there are fine restaurants, bars, cafes and high-quality boutiques throughout the 
town.    The products that can be seen in boutiques, showrooms and tree-shaded courtyards of 
colonial houses are of high quality, ranging from traditional Mexican-baroque to modern 
updated hacienda-style design objects.  Buyers come from around the world to Tlaquepaque, 
and a high proportion of its products are exported to North America and Europe. Behind 
many of these courtyards, and interspersed throughout surrounding residential areas, is a 
multitude of small- and medium-sized workshops.  
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 The vast Northeastern region of Brazil also has well-developed artisanal and 
handicraft industries – in ceramics, decorative arts, and housewares – as well as industrial 
production of many low-technology goods such as wooden and metal furniture, and 
significant output of clothing and shoes in both large and small firms.  Visitors to these firms 
have a strikingly different impression from Tonalà and Tlaquepaque.3  Some firms are located 
in the industrial neighborhoods of cities such as Fortaleza or Recife.  The feeling is of 
grueling industrial work, often hazardous and dirty, whether it be IN shoes or ceramics.  
Similar kinds of factories can be found in grimy frontier towns such as Imperatriz, in the state 
of Maranhão,  just on the border between the Northeast and Amazonia, where cheap furniture 
is made from tropical hardwoods by low-paid workers.  The Northeast also boasts its share of 
industrial estates, where the visitor is stunned to travel down long dusty dirt roads “to the 
middle of nowhere,” and to find modern shoe and textile factories, with the latest Italian and 
Swiss machinery, staffed by a small number of industrial workers, with managers and 
engineers there to oversee the machinery and attend to orders from computer rooms linked to 
the outside world by fiber-optic cables. The workers typically have an air of quiet resignation 
and their monthly minimum-wage salaries4 are supplemented by food baskets containing 
packages of rice, beans and other basic necessities. 
Moreover, the Northeast is not a developmental success in the low-technology 
industries: its export levels are extremely low, its penetration of national markets in Brazil is 
fragile and generally limited to low-quality products,  and overall developmental indicators 
such as the ratio of regional wages to national wages have not progressed much in forty years 
                                                                                                                                                        
2 Two days per week when goods are sold not only in shops, but in street markets.  
3  A word on the scale of the comparison reported in this paper : we use the term « Northeast » to refer to  case 
studies which are more precisely about a set of cities and towns in that region , or industrial clusters in cities, 
including in and around Fortaleza, Recife, Salvador, and Imperatriz.  Because, as shall be shown, we argue that 
the dynamics of failure are widespread, we use the moniker « Northeast » to generalize across these case studies.  
In Mexico. Tlaquepaque and Tonalá are used as examples of a different developmental dynamic which is also 
found, with some variation, across a wider region including parts of the states of Jalisco, Michoacán and Léon.  
Thus, the comparison concerns industrial localities set in wider regional contexts in both countries. 
4 Equivalent in May 2003 to USD80.00, for 44 hours per week. 
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of intense policy-led effort to develop the region. Why has the Northeast failed where these 
areas of Jalisco have succeeded?  Failure and success, we shall argue in this paper, are closely 
related to different incentives.  Success is based on the incentives that flow from generalized 
confidence in the economic process; appropriate distributional arrangements; and ongoing 
collective problem-solving and conflict resolution. These differences in incentives are 
reflected in such areas as entrepreneurship, coordination with other firms and actors, and  
investments in physical capital and skills.   
Why are the incentives so different from Jalisco to the Nordeste? The three types of 
incentive are defined by the interaction between what we shall call societal and 
communitarian forces in each region. Think of community as bonding among people with 
strongly similar backgrounds and interests, and society as forms of bridging between those 
groups; both can be institutionalized in rules, laws, and shared conventions, but societal 
bridging is more often formal than communitarian bonding.5 Well-studied low-tech success 
stories such as the Third Italy are often said to be successful because of the communitarian 
structures that make collective coordination possible.  Tight social networks, anchored by 
mutual trust and reputation effects, facilitate the information flows that underpin an elaborate, 
highly flexible and innovative production system.  High commitment of individuals to firms 
and of firms to the region enables skills to be transmitted via socialization in regional 
networks (Becattini,1987).  At the same time, in another part of Italy, economic stagnation is 
often ascribed to communitarian structures of another sort (Gambetta, 1988).  The 
Mezzogiorno is a prisoner of clan-like communities who make normal free markets 
impossible. Interestingly, this kind of difference is found in debates about sources of success 
in many other places.  Silicon Valley is described by some analysts as a tightly-woven 
community, whose economic performance depends on informal networks of entrepreneurs 
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and technologists (Saxenian, 1994).  But by others it is described as a set of overlapping 
markets, with research universities, government financing, venture capitalist, law firms, stock 
options, high labor mobility, and brutal competition (Cohen and Fields, 1999). Taiwan’s 
success is sometimes said to stem from family- and community-based systems of 
coordination, and sometimes criticized for being a form of crony capitalism; others claim 
simply that Taiwan followed the rules of export markets, just as Silicon Valley pushed market 
logic to its limits in the United States (Wade, 1990). Thus,  in these stories of economic 
development, some claim that the right institutions are communitarian, in the sense of strong 
bonding within social groups that have positive effects on the economic system.  Others, 
however, claim that it is the force of commercial culture, of widely-accepted principles of 
competition, that are the source of success;  it is society, not community, that generates 
development.  
In contrast to both sides in this debate, we argue  that both society and community are 
necessary and it is their interactions which determine whether and to what extent the 
appropriate incentives to economic development are generated.   What matters is the relative 
strengths of society and community, their institutional forms, and how they interact in shaping 
incentives which in turn enable the long-term process of economic growth. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
5 These definitions bear an intentional similarity to those used by Putnam, 2000, though in our view the sources 
of each can be quite different than those claimed by Putnam.  Our position is described in greater detail in 
Storper, 2005.  
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Table 1: 
  THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SOCIETY-COMMUNITY INTERACTIONS  
INCENTIVES 
NECESSARY TO 
LONG-TERM 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
PRINCIPAL MICRO-
ECONOMIC 
EFFECTS OF EACH 
INCENTIVE 
OPERATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS: 
BEHAVIOR, 
ROUTINES, 
REGULARITIES  
ROLE OF 
COMMUNITARIAN 
“BONDING” IN 
BRINGING ABOUT 
EACH  INCENTIVE 
ROLE OF 
SOCIETAL 
“BRIDGING” IN 
BRINGING ABOUT 
EACH INCENTIVE 
 
 
 
 
Generalized 
confidence 
↓ 
? Reduces 
transactions 
costs 
? Reduces moral 
hazards 
? Raises 
expectations and 
efforts 
↓ 
? Encourages 
Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur 
? Improves 
coordination of 
firm-firm 
transactions 
? Raises 
investment levels 
↓               → 
? Reputation 
effects, shared 
conventions, 
identities: 
(depends on 
process of group 
formation): 
? overcome certain 
information 
problems in low-
cost way (but can 
encourage rent-
seeking) 
→ 
? Overarching 
rules promote 
transparency 
and limit rent-
seeking, help to 
complete 
markets 
 
 
← 
 
 
 
Effective and 
acceptable 
distributional 
arrangements 
↓↓ 
? precedent 
encourages 
ongoing 
'sacrifices' in 
face of shocks 
(Rodrik) 
? Overcomes 
disincentive to 
participate and 
make effort 
(Aghion) 
↓↓ 
? Raises 
investments in 
skills 
? Raises work and 
entrepreneurial 
participation 
rates 
? Improves 
willingness to 
pay taxes 
(investment) 
↓↓                   
→ 
? Voice and loyalty 
? Being in the 
same boat 
enhances 
acceptability 
? Membership 
may involve real 
forms of  intra-
group 
redistribution 
 
 
 
 
 
→ 
 
? Counteracts 
corporatism and 
distributional 
hold-ups 
? Standards of 
fairness and 
efficiency 
constrain group 
demands 
? Inter-group 
mobility (exit), 
disciplines 
groups 
 
← 
 
 
Successful ongoing 
conflict resolution 
? Participation of 
groups is 
enhanced 
? minimize rent-
seeking from 
corporatism 
 
? Better 
adjustment of 
rules governing 
entrepreneurship 
and labor 
markets.          
? Intelligent ideas 
more likely to 
receive support 
as public policy 
? Coalitions can 
form, avoiding 
chaotic 
instability 
→ 
? Secure groups 
encourage 
coalition 
formation: voice 
that gets heard 
(but risk of P-A 
problems) 
 
 
 
 
→ 
 
 
? Limits to group 
power encourage 
compromise 
? Exit options, 
defection, make 
other coalitions 
possible, hence 
dynamically 
limit P-A 
problems 
← 
Legend: 
→↓   : cumulative and/or one-way causal effect 
→←:  two-way interactions and feedbacks 
 The crux of our argument is shown in the fourth and fifth columns of Table 1.  Each of  
the  features of successful development depends on both community-based and societally-
based relationships between persons, and on the interactions between these two forms of 
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coordination.  This interaction, when successful, is one of mutual checks and balances; when 
unsuccessful, the checks and balances are not sufficiently present, allowing the potentially 
negative effects of society or community alone to make themselves felt. 
When the conditions do not exist for society-community interactions of mutual checks 
and balances,  however, then other less favorable outcomes for economic development are 
likely to be the result.  In the case of Northeastern Brazil, we shall see that relatively strong, 
but distorted forms of societal rules, combined with weak communities, generate insufficient 
public goods; low confidence and high transaction costs; and a distribution of wealth that 
reduces motivation for entrepreneurship.  In Tonalà and Tlaquepacque, by contrast, society 
and community interact to sustain confidence, shape distributional arrangements and foster 
problem-solving such that innovation is ongoing and  sustains local development.  
 
3. THE PERVERSE EFFECTS OF A “CIVILIZING PROCESS:”  SOCIETY 
AGAINST COMMUNITY IN THE BRAZILIAN NORTHEAST    
 
 
  The Brazilian Nordeste remains the country’s unsolved “regional question," a source 
of  worry for decades.6 The conventional diagnosis of  Brazil's "Northeast problem" is that it 
stems from the region's imperfect integration into the national society. This is said to be the 
consequence of a social structure molded by a colonial plantation economy and slavery, 
leading to a post-colonial society split between a landowning economic and political elite and 
impoverished landless masses afflicted by recurrent droughts. An integrated regional 
development program for the Northeast,  authored in the mid-1950s under the aegis of the 
                                                 
6 Some basic indicators of economic development for the two areas are provided in the Appendix.  The Northeast 
is a much bigger region than Jalisco and Michoacán (40 million versus 10 million people, representing 
respectively about one quarter of Brazil’s population and 12% of Mexico’s).  However, both are regions with big 
cities, poor rural hinterlands, ethnic specificities when compared to the “core” regions of each country.  No inter-
regional comparison can, of course, ever have the quality of a controlled experiment, and it is important to bear 
in mind questions of regional history and context when carrying out comparisons of the sort undertaken here, in 
which we have attempted to deploy the theoretical framework presented in the previous section in as rigorous, 
but still context-sensitive, manner as possible.  
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GTDN and later the SUDENE,7 placed emphasis on developing its social and economic 
infrastructure.  This was to be accompanied by massive investments to link the Northeast 
physically and economically to the rest of Brazil, and to install modern social institutions, a 
market culture, and modern industries. The latter were to be implanted through public 
investments (nationalized industries and subsidies), on the basis of a strategy of generating 
backward and forward linkages and hence generating self-propelling development. The 
development of the Northeast was to  accomplish a “civilizing process,” extended from the 
core of Brazilian society and territory, to its periphery. 
Certain forms of economic progress do exist in the region, largely confined to large-
scale factories of nationalized firms and to the development of a service economy in the 
coastal cities. There have also been significant improvements in some indicators, including 
income, health and literacy.  Nonetheless, in relative terms, the NE is just as far behind the 
rest of Brazil as it was at the beginning of the development push more than forty years ago. 
Wages in manufacturing are only 55% of the Brazilian average, with output per worker at 
only 48% of the Brazilian average. Manufacturing employment has stagnated at less than 16% 
of the Brazilian total, in spite of massive incentives (Lavinas, Garcia and Barros, 2000). The 
Northeast’s share of GDP has fluctuated between  12-16% of the Brazilian total since the 
1970s, and its share of Brazilian exports  declined from 20% in 1975 to 7% in 2001. Overall 
household income levels and income per capita are around half the Brazilian average.8  
In contrast to the dominant views, our conclusion from a three-year study of the 
region’s low-technology industries is that economic integration and a certain form of 
modernization have succeeded. It is development that has failed. This is because integration 
                                                 
7 The GTDN refers to the Working Group for the Development of the Northeast and the SUDENE the 
Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast. 
8 Lavinas, Borges Lemos and Rolim (1999), in an analysis of national accounts, show that there is a net export of 
capital from the Northeast to other regions of Brazil, on the part of Brazilian firms implanted in the Northeast.  
This is yet another sign of the underlying lack of attractiveness of the Northeast: the fact that firms do not 
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has been achieved at the price of importing many of the worst characteristics of Brazilian 
economic culture in general – lack of generalized confidence, unworkable distributional 
arrangements, and ongoing conflict and unstable coalitions.  These strong societal features 
interact with elite clannish behavior, and block the creation of incentives that would be 
necessary to generate a vibrant indigenous entrepreneurial economy. Moreover, this grafting 
of the national economic culture onto the NE generates few of the advantages of bigness, 
concentration and State-sponsored capitalism that have benefited southeastern Brazil.  
The overwhelming majority of local firms in these sectors in the Northeast make 
products that target the lower reaches of their markets, with only occasional forays into 
medium- and high-quality products. 9  Some firms act as mass production subcontractors or 
are assembly plants owned by medium-to-large sized Brazilian firms, mostly from the 
southern and southeast regions. The products of the latter are destined for national markets; by 
contrast, the products of NE firms are destined principally for regional markets; neither 
category has any significant presence in markets outside of Brazil, with the exception of shoe-
producing firms who work for foreign buyers.  Though entrepreneurs and managers regularly 
attend trade shows in the USA and Europe, and a significant percentage are well aware of new 
product concepts and production technologies, for the most part, their ambitions are limited.  
Table 2 shows the interactions between society and community which account for this lack of 
local ambition and the limited local ambitions of national firms, which in turn limit 
developmental success in the Northeast.   
                                                                                                                                                        
practice ongoing capital-augmenting investments, but rather use the region as a source of short-term profits, 
which are not reinvested in the Northeast. 
9 We performed site visits, interviews with key actors in both firms and government, in sectors which are 
amenable to this type of upgrading via learning, but which start out with low barriers to entry and low 
technological requirements.  These sectors include glassware and ceramics, shoes, textiles, food products made 
with tropical fruits, wood furniture, and certain services (Lavinas and Storper, 1999, 2000, 2001).  Additional 
interviews were carried out in the machinery sector and in certain services industry firms, especially courier 
services.  Also interviewed were local and state economic development officials, and university-based 
incubators.”  Detailed statistical analysis was carried out at the Institute for Applied Economic Research, IPEA, 
in Rio de Janeiro.  
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INCENTIVES INSTITUTIONAL- 
IZED BEHAVIOR 
COMMUNITARIAN 
FORCES 
SOCIETAL FORCES 
Lack of generalized 
confidence: predation 
and uncertainty 
? Poor interfirm 
coordination 
? Large firm 
dominancem 
disconnected from 
local networks 
? Predatory 
behavior in 
markets 
? Regional, low-cost, 
low-quality 
markets. 
? Weak local 
institutions for 
promoting 
generalized trust, 
confidence in 
transactions 
? Highly 
personalized, 
nepotistic 
relationships 
? High local 
clientelism 
? Widespread 
corruption 
? Instability in 
relationships 
? National policies 
and institutions 
that promote 
oligopolies 
? Powerful actors 
diminish local 
margin of 
maneuver 
? High national 
clientelism 
reinforces power 
of oligopolists 
? Macroeconomic 
instability favors  
bigger firms 
Unsatisfactory 
distributional 
tradeoffs/ 
arrangements: 
low effort, misguided 
effort 
? Local 
entrepreneurs 
have low 
ambitions: the 
playing field is 
seen as being 
highly uneven: 
regional rivalries  
within Brazil + no 
ambition to export 
? Non-elite cannot 
get into 
entrepreneurship 
because of 
inequality level 
? Workers have 
effort disincentive 
due to inequality 
 
? Local 
entrepreneurs seek 
rents whenever 
possible: markets 
incomplete, 
skewed 
? Rent “niches” are 
leftovers from 
dominant national 
firms 
? Labor unable to 
press for 
upgrading, 
inclusion, training 
(extreme 
inequality) 
? Dominant groups 
seek rents, 
institutionalize 
them, esp. 
extremely unequal 
access to credit 
and subsidies 
? Rents reinforce 
protectionist, 
inward orientation 
? Labor dominated 
by corporatist 
representation. 
? High level of 
informality and 
non-
representation; 
? State institutions  
not strongly 
organized on the 
ground 
 
Ongoing conflict and 
lack of problem-
solving 
? Inability to form 
sustainable 
developmental 
coalitions in the 
region 
? Conflict dominates 
in face of economic 
shocks, for all 
classes: sense that 
someone else is not 
sacrificing 
? Firm-worker 
conflictual 
relations 
? Conflictual 
sectional 
(interregional) 
relations 
? Low-quality, get 
in/get out 
? Low sectoral 
cooperation: 
networks are 
fragile, unstable 
? Low firm-worker 
problem-
solving:conflictual 
and formalistic 
relations 
? Conflict leads to 
short-term 
strategies, unstable 
and shifting 
relations between 
groups 
? Many have good 
ideas, but nobody 
builds coalitions to 
push them 
? Inequality too high 
? Policy is 
interventionist 
? But policy not 
transparent or 
stable 
? Depends on power 
? Policies work coup 
par coup, lack 
medium-term 
consistency and 
predictability 
? Winners take all in 
policy competition, 
until next round 
? But political 
alliances shift, so 
even elite 
coalitions do not 
have ability to 
push strategies in 
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strategies because 
of uncertainty, 
fear of predation, 
politics 
? Difficult to get 
good ideas 
implemented, 
accepted, even 
though their value 
is widely 
recognized 
? Extremely 
conflictual society 
at the local level as 
well 
sustainable way 
? No tradition of 
consensus-seeking 
 
 
 
 
3.1 LACK OF CONFIDENCE 
 
There is nothing automatic or universal in the ways that entrepreneurship is carried 
out; economies vary widely in their collective entrepreneurial levels and habits (Casson, 1995; 
Kirzner, 1973). Brazil has a powerful large-firm presence in many sectors, which are 
“piloted” by the big firms, who exercise critical market power, access to distribution, and 
technological mastery.10  These firms also have political access, especially to public credit 
through the BNDES,11 and thus have dramatically more staying power than do small firms, 
especially  in the face of Brazil’s endemic macroeconomic instability and the ability to exploit 
rents from public policies that consistently favor the big firms.  Consistent with this, many 
Brazilian sectors are highly oligopolistic, well beyond what one would expect in a domestic 
economy of its size. And, unlike South Korea -- another "big firm" developing economy 
(Amsden, 1992) --  Brazil exports a very small percentage of its output, 12 but its big firms do 
earn significant rents in domestic markets. 
                                                 
10  Indeed, large-firm presence in Brazil is much greater than in Mexico, and average manufacturing productivity 
much higher.  Part of this has to do with the bigger internal market in Brazil, but this makes it all the more 
striking that there is little observable benefit to the Brazilian export sector.  And it also illustrates that the barriers 
to entry for Northeastern firms are quite high, because of the way that economies of scale have been developed 
in many Brazilian manufacturing sectors (see Mulder, Montout and Lopes, 2002 for a Brazil-Mexico 
comparison). 
11 “Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social,” i.e. the National Bank for Economic and Social 
Development. 
12 The dominant view of this in Brazil is that protectionism on the part of the EU and the USA is to blame for 
Brazil’s poor export performance.  It is incontestable that Brazil’s main export strength, agricultural 
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 In spite of this big firm orientation, Brazil is also a highly entrepreneurial economy; its 
overall rate of entrepreneurial activity per 100 adults is ranked 5th in the world, just ahead of 
Ireland and the USA (Reynolds et al, 2001). In the West, South and Southeast of Brazil, there 
were many examples of such entrepreneurship leading to long-term growth, from small to 
medium- and even large size, especially during the period of rapid development in the 1950s 
and 1960s; however, Northeastern startups were not part of this process, and today they do not 
follow this growth pattern. Part of this has to do with the phenomenon of being a "latecomer" 
region in a country with more highly developed regions and their firms and of having missed 
out on the great developmental jump of earlier decades.  NE firms occasionally – though not 
frequently – become suppliers to big national firms from other regions. While this may 
provide them markets, it does so within the established structure of oligopolistic markets, and 
so places local firms in positions of submission to large national firms, and discourages them 
from striking out on their own.  An analogy may help in understanding this. The United States 
does not do well in many of the industries in which Italy does.  It is difficult to imagine 
American firms engaging in the small-scale high quality furniture production which abounds 
in Italy, because US national supply structures are dominated by large firms. Small firms, 
when successful, are likely to be bought up in the US, their products commercialized at vast 
scale, and subjected to mass marketing.  This isn’t a problem if there are other areas in which 
regions can excel.  But it is a problem for a region such as the NE, because it starts out in a 
dependent position and does not have the means to enter as an innovator in other markets.  
Northeastern SMEs respond to this situation by avoiding competition with the big 
national firms, but in the wrong way.  They orient themselves toward regional markets for the 
low-quality products that do not interest the national firms. They exploit limited incomplete 
                                                                                                                                                        
commodities, would grow considerably were there not such agricultural protection in Europe and the USA.  
However, this would do little for Brazil’s weakness in manufactured exports, and can not explain why Brazil has 
done so much more poorly over the last 50 years than other countries, especially the HPAEs, which started out in 
the same position as Brazil. For a detailed comparative analysis, see Amsden, 2001. 
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areas in markets through a calculated risk strategy, but they do not benefit from sufficient 
optimism or confidence in the economic process to undertake true, market-reshaping 
innovative entrepreneurship (Knight, 1921; Casson, 1995; Kirzner; 1973; Schumpeter, 1991).     
 Still, these problems cannot be attributed exclusively to the predatory large-firm 
behavior which is encouraged by these societal forces. The communitarian forces that might, 
under some circumstances, be capable of generating entrepreneurial capabilities capable of 
innovating in the face of these market structures, do not exist.  Some would counter that, in 
any case, communitarian forces that support entrepreneurialism never constitute serious 
competition for oligopolistic firms, but examples such as the post-war experience of the Third 
Italy prove them wrong.13
 Thus, there is clear existence of a problem of society versus  community:  regional 
entrepreneurs have low ambitions, not because they lack creativity or knowledge, but because 
of rational fear of the risks that come from the national (societal) environment, and this lack 
of generalized confidence is not counterbalanced by the alternative of solid communities that 
could facilitate coordination.  
 
3.2 DISTRIBUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS: HIERARCHY AND RENT-
EXTRACTION 
 
 The situation described above is reinforced through  distributional arrangements – big 
and southern versus small and northern firms, and successful rent-seeking by the former 
group to the exclusion of the latter. Distributional arrangements also concern the distribution 
of wage income.  The literature on  success stories makes a great deal out of the “good” work 
habits found in those places, as opposed to the bad or “disorganized” labor markets in other 
                                                 
13 In the face of highly oligopolistic firms in Lombardy and the Piedmont, which were favored by the national 
government in Rome, the firms in the Third Italy managed, through local collective action underpinned by 
generalized confidence, to carve out viable market niches for themselves and came to dominate Italy (and many  
export markets).  
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places. In the countries that have done well in the kinds of industries we considered in the NE, 
many approaches to shaping labor markets are in evidence. In Italy the entrepreneur is often a 
former worker, the family unit remains important in many industries,  workers often have 
strong durable ties to local communities, and local and regional states in turn play an 
important role in labor training (Becattini, 1987).  In Denmark, family is not especially 
important, but local ties are, with extensive cooperation in the locality, in the context of a 
highly-regulated national labor market which shapes relations on the shop floor, in the 
direction of equality and mutual respect (Lorenzon, 1999; Lundvall, 2002). In Taiwan and 
Hong Kong, families often own and operate firms, with multigenerational extended families 
providing the firm’s labor and capital resources, to some extent outside normal market circuits 
(Numazaki, 1991).  
 Brazil does not closely resemble any of these examples, though there are certain 
features of the Brazilian labor supply process which have counterparts elsewhere. For 
example, Brazil has a history of large-scale unionism (like Italy and Korea), a large unionized 
public sector and a tradition of corporatism in its labor market (as in France) (Marsden, 1999). 
Labor relations have been conflictual, as in South Korea.  Brazil, and especially Northeastern 
Brazil, however, stand in contrast to all these examples in the key ways its institutional 
framework generates labor supplies and incentives to work, train, and learn.  Most important, 
in our view, is that  South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong all have much lower levels of 
inequality than does Brazil; in the first two cases because there were significant land reforms 
at the beginning of the current industrialization process. Brazil, by contrast, has industrialized 
against the background of an enormous rural population lacking access to land resources and 
hence in the possibility of a satisfactory rural life, along with rapid urbanization and 
industrialization, and extensive modernization of the agricultural sector.  Income inequality is 
among the highest in the industrialized world. Education is highly uneven, with significant 
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parts of the population lacking literacy or other non-manual skills or having insufficient levels 
of them. Moreover, though these are general characteristics of the national labor market and 
income structure, they are more severe in the Northeast.  Recent theories hold that both 
labor and entrepreneurial effort and participation can be subject to a strong disincentive effect 
above  certain degrees of inequality (Aghion, 1998).  This is because the probability of getting 
access to such essential resources as a decent wage or capital (respectively) is extremely low 
when inequality is extremely high and positionality effects are high.  
Brazil also has a strongly formalistic system of labor relations, anchored in huge union 
federations,14 modeled after certain European countries; the State is the key intermediating 
actor between these “social partners” (Marsden, 1999).  Given the extreme inequalities of 
Brazil, however, the most frequent outcome of this situation has not been sustained dialogue 
between worker and employer organizations, but a distant and conflictual relationship, and a 
high degree of state paternalism.  The paternalistic labor relations system actually interferes 
with building the communities through which independence and upgrading might one day 
become possible. Labor is thus largely unable to serve as a force for constructing any putative 
developmental coalition. Aggravating this situation is the fact that even these rather dismal 
formal relations apply to only 40% of the work force, so that for the other 60% 
straightforward power relations – highly asymmetrical because of a very high rate of 
informality and extreme abundance of the unskilled – are the rule ( Oliveira, 2003). 
 Though schooling has improved somewhat15 -- with higher rates of school attendance 
and growing literacy -- the average poor person in the Northeast has little or no chance of 
using much more than very modest improvements in formal education (Easterly, 2002). The 
middle classes are, of course, where the strongest incentives for knowledge accumulation and 
                                                 
14 As in certain European countries, the Brazilian union federations control big pension funds and administer 
them, and pay for big professional staffs via this activity.  They are also the privileged negotiators of changes in 
labor law with their respective legislatures. In some countries, they are constitutionally recognized in these roles 
(Marsden, 1999).  
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use are present; and yet, as we have seen, these middle class entrepreneurs, even when they 
are skilled and knowledgable,  are frustrated at every turn in the road.  
  
3.3 THE ABSENCE OF COALITIONS THAT COULD SOLVE PROBLEMS AND 
GENERATE CONFIDENCE 
 
 
 The various problems described above interact and have cumulative effects, one of 
which is to limit the formation of coalitions that would boost the developmental potential of 
the Northeast.  Society-community interactions that are present in the Northeast conspire to 
generate conflict, unstable and shifting coalitions, and hence lack of capacity for long-term 
upgrading of industrial performance.   
The vicious circle of low-skills, low-wages, high mobility, low trust of workers, and a 
huge skills gap between management and workers, is not just injurious to the social mobility 
of the less-skilled; it has the wider effect discouraging firms from training their workers or 
trying to involve them in a medium-term strategy of quality improvement. Labor is thus not 
present as an institutional agent in any putative developmental coalitions.  
One of the principal areas in which this failure to have problem-solving coalitions is 
reflected is in the poor export performance of the Brazilian economy.  Enhancing export 
performance obviously depends in part on relatively straightforward technical measures: tariff 
policies; bureaucratic efficiency in import and export regulation, inspection, and 
transportation; clear and enforceable contracting and payment procedures, aligned with 
international norms, and so on.  Serving external markets, however, also requires coordination 
with those markets, which in turn depends on the development of detailed networks of human 
relations: between domestic producers, trading companies, and external buyers. It requires 
building up a reputation for on-time production of goods that conform to the prices and 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 Average years of schooling for Brazil as a whole is six compared to four for the Northeast.  
 16
qualities desired, and that the coordination between producer, transporter and buyer link the 
producer successfully to the outside.  It requires absorption of information from buyers and 
from external market “environments” about the evolution of products and confidence on the 
part of external buyers that producers will be able to keep up with this evolution. Generalized 
confidence is essential to all these transactional processes.  A number of our interviews were 
disturbing in relation to these criteria.  While only a minority of the entrepreneurs interviewed 
were unaware of these requirements, many  more evidenced an attitude of resignation with 
respect to their capacity to meet them or even with respect to the possibility of developing 
such capabilities.   To transform such an  environment would require collective action, but 
there is a  lack of effective developmentalist coalitions which would be capable of doing so.  
This is merely a particularly severe expressions of the institutional dynamics of the 
Brazilian economy as a whole, albeit with certain regional specificities.  In this vein, Schmitz 
(1999) studied industries in the Sinos Valley in the southern state of  Rio Grande do Sul, one 
of the areas of Brazil that has been most successful in industrializing based on small- and 
medium-sized firms.  He showed that developmental coalition-building failed there because 
firms are reluctant to engage in any kind of horizontal cooperation.  Hence, attempts at 
upgrading production systems through organizations designed to promote more effective 
marketing through quality standards, respect of delivery times, and consistent use of design 
information, have failed. 
Things are not like this in all low-tech regions in developing countries, however; the 
examples of our two clusters in the state of Jalisco, Mexico provide a counter-example to the 
Brazilian Northeast, in virtually all respects. 
 
 
4.  TWO INNOVATIVE SMALL-FIRM CLUSTERS IN JALISCO, MEXICO 
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 Like Brazil, Mexico engaged in a strong effort during the 1990s to integrate itself into 
the global economy.  Unlike Brazil, which remained relatively closed, the Mexican economy 
saw rapid growth in the value of its exports (30% of GNP as against 6% for Brazil), exporting 
almost three times as much as Brazil, whose economy is larger than Mexico’s.  Of course, a 
principal reason for this development is Mexico’s proximity to the USA, its principal trading 
partner, reinforced via its entry into NAFTA.  But the effects of globalization are wider and 
deeper than this point might suggest, and some of them --- such as the case we are about to 
analyze – predate NAFTA by many decades. 
 The region of Guadalajara, including parts of the state of Jalisco and the neighboring 
state of Michoacán, is home to numerous vibrant clusters of small- and medium-sized firms 
dedicated to a wide range of goods.  In the Mexican economic literature, Guadalajara is 
known as “the big city of small firms” (Arias, 1985).   From the colonial period to the present, 
the entrepreneurship of the region has been reflected in a much greater presence of  SMEs 
than the national average.  In the metropolitan area and its hinterlands can be found clusters of 
SMEs in jewelry, accounting for 60% of national output in gold jewelry, and a district 
specializing in women’s shoes which is second in Mexico only to the much-studied cluster in 
the state of Guanajuato.  Guadalajara has twice as many firms as the Monterrey metropolitan 
area.  And labor force statistics show that Jalisco has a far higher proportion of workers 
without wage-income, i.e. workers in family firms, than does the nation as a whole (see Table 
3).  Tonalà and Tlaquepaque (henceforth, T&T) are of particular interest because of their 
concentrations of firms engaged in production of low technology goods – housewares, 
furniture, ceramic tiles and other artisanal building materials, glassware – with a very high 
proportion of output destined for export markets. They are thus comparable to the activities 
we examined in the Brazilian Nordeste. 
___________________________________________________________________________  
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TABLE 3: MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES IN THE DISTRICTS16
Tlaquepaque       
Selected activities        
 economic units17 employment  
 1988 1993 1998 1988 1993 1998
Total  manufacturing 545 979 1858 7224 13961 20107
Garment, textiles, leather 12 28 71 955 706 1506
Wood industries and wood products 43 85 211 818 1049 1837
Mineral non metallic product. (except products derived from 
petroleum and coal) 126 173 419 1788 1707 2650
3812, metal structures including herreria  62 120 185 152 899 1219
3813, metal furniture 8 14 39 62 252 411
Total  selected  sectors 251 420 925 3775 4613 7623
       
Tonalà         
 1988 1993 1998 1988 1993 1998
       
Total manufacturing 275 502 2475 1428 2759 10814
Garment, textiles, leather  21 100 393 801
Wood industries and wood products 10 31 236 29 114 1204
Mineral non metallic product. Except products derived from petroleum 
and coal 139 151 1264 750 1064 5081
3812, metal structures including herreria  25 67 174 59 172 442
3813, metal furniture   6 83 66 500
Total  selected  sectors 174 276 1857 838 1809 8028
       
       
Tonala and Tlaquepaque       
Selected sectors 425 696 2782 4613 6422 15651
 
Detail on production activities in Tonala 
Tonala Census summary18  
   
Product Workshops %
Clay and ceramics 812 66.9
Stonework 17 1.4
Plaster 93 7.7
Bronze, copper and brass 32 2.6
Papier mache 85 7.0
Blown glass 43 3.5
Furniture and 
wood products 42 3.5
Tinware 18 1.5
Ironworks 37 3.1
Various 34 2.8
Total 1213 100
___________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                 
16 Source: Economic Census. INEGI. 1988, 1993, 1999. 
17 The census counts both formal and informal sector firms ; however, it is very likely that informal firms are 
undercounted because many do not have an official address or are in residential quarters with no indication of 
being a business. 
18 Source: Casa de Artesanos de Tonalà, Census of Artisans 1997. 
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 Tonalà and Tlaquepaque are successful because each has strong incentives for 
production and accumulation which are outcomes of the interactions between community and 
society, as summarized in Table 4. 
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 INCENTIVES INSTITUTIONAL- 
IZED BEHAVIORS 
COMMUNITARIAN 
FORCES 
SOCIETAL FORCES 
 
Socially-constructed, 
localized confidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1200 SMEs in Tonalà. 
800-1000 in Tlaq. 
= strong 
entrepreneurship. 
Schumpeterian in Tlaq 
(innovation); 
Kirznerian in Tonalá 
(market niches). 
 
Excellent inter-firm 
coordination: family 
firms are 
subcontractors to 
medium-sized firms 
and international 
marketing agents (like 
Italian imprenditori) 
 
Cooperation helps 
intermediators 
promote districts’ 
products to outside, 
tempers corruption 
and moral hazards 
inside 
 
Reputation effects are 
central 
 
There are limits on 
predatory, price-
exploitative behavior 
on part of 
distributors/intermed-
iators 
 
International markets 
= incentive to keep 
trying, but also to 
adapt, refine, innovate 
products based on 
local culture/skills/look 
(the “scarce” asset) 
 
 
  
Entrepreneurs know, 
identify with each 
other. 
 
Informal 
associationalism within 
district reduces 
transaction costs and 
moral hazards. 
 
Informal cooperation 
between producers and 
intermediators  
 
Most local 
intermediators are in it 
for the long-run, 
because see themselves 
as part of community, 
diminishing attempts 
to exploit producers 
 
Production sharing is 
common 
 
“What produces 
growth is not the State, 
but pre-Hispanic 
culture and “mestizo 
sincretism” (local 
bonds prevail) 
 
Long-time presence of 
foreigners who link 
local producers to 
world markets = 
reinforces confidence 
 
Local actors in concert 
with locally-involved 
foreigners = 
circumvent national 
oligopolies, avoid 
corruption 
 
National 
distributors/intermedi
ators create price 
pressure on producers 
 
Macroeconomic 
instability somewhat 
offset by access to 
foreign markets, and 
by commitment to 
quality 
 
Imported business 
practices help stabilize 
the situation, incentive 
to do so 
 
International markets 
create price and 
quality incentives and 
possibility of expansion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distributional 
arrangements: 
hierarchical, but stable 
and considered fair: 
incentives to keep 
trying 
 
Local 
entrepreneurship 
encouraged and 
transmitted from 
owners/artisans to 
workers and within 
families 
 
Incentives to work 
hard because 
possibility of long-term 
 
Medium-sized firms 
(50-60 empl) use 
family-community 
system to regulate 
labor supply and 
distributional rules 
 
Other firms specialize 
in  consolidation  and 
act as “cultural 
translators:” define 
orders, finance, and 
 
Local groups have 
access to local political 
power, but foreigners 
have access to markets 
and information 
(sometimes they are 
mixed: there are many 
couple-based firms 
where one is Mexican 
the other non-
Mexican) 
 21
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
survival or even 
“getting ahead” 
 
Even indigenous 
people have a chance: 
some village 
production has become 
stable and 
remunerative 
organize 
subcontracting 
 
Blurred distinction 
between workers, 
entrepreneurs, families 
= transmission of 
skills, bonding to avoid 
moral hazards, secure 
quality 
 
Foreigners who 
appreciate local 
culture actually 
reinforce local bonding 
 
Thus, there are local-
global intermediaries 
 
Pressure from world 
market is real: foreign 
buyers seek cheaper 
imitations in other 
countries 
 
 
 
Dynamic problem-
solving, adjustments, 
responses to crisis, 
institutional 
innovations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nexus of foreign 
community, 
cosmopolitan buyers 
and shippers, powerful 
family-ethnic culture, 
artisans 
 
Locals have a stake in 
problem-solving, there 
is no winner-take-all 
solution 
 
Relatively non-
antagonistic relations 
because many 
entrepreneurs are 
former 
workers/artisans 
 
Many different voices, 
but overlapping 
networks for 
expressing 
 
Local informal 
solutions arise in order 
to circumvent national 
politics, rules, and 
bureaucracy, and to 
temper local 
corruption, and 
informal relations are 
stronger than formal 
 
Intermediaries have to 
press for local 
solutions in terms of 
price and quality: 
reality check is strong, 
but so is creativity to 
respond. 
 
Coalitions form which 
do not depend directly 
on national politics or 
political brokers 
 
Local formal 
associations are 
sometimes captured by 
national political 
parties and/or become 
corrupt 
 
 
4.1  CONFIDENCE 
 In the small-firm clusters in T&T,  there is strong localized confidence in the 
sustainability of the local economies.  This is not to say that there are not great hardships, 
including economic cycles, competitive pressures inside and from outside the districts, and 
even failures of local cooperation, cheating and corruption.  All in all, however, there is a 
strong sense – supported by experience – that the clusters have staying power and offer 
conditions under which skill and hard work can pay off.   The evidence for such confidence is 
strong.  As the statistics show, T&T have enjoyed steady growth in the number of firms, 
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employment and exports.  In qualitative terms, interviews demonstrate the importance of 
reputation effects in limiting, though not eliminating, predatory behavior – especially 
undercutting local prices by cheating on product quality or working conditions so much that 
competitors cannot survive. 
One important reason why confidence is renewed is the connection to international 
markets; they provide a long-term demand level which local or national markets could never 
sustain.  75% of blown glass and 60% of ceramics production were exported in the late 
eighties (Mercado Martinez, 1989) and this dynamism persists today. Confidence comes from 
the fact that the districts have survived several rounds of being challenged by competitors, and 
reinventing themselves to serve foreign markets through better or updated products. 
 This long-term staying power is a result of ongoing adaptation, the incorporation of 
national and international artistic influences, and the inclusion of new Mexican and foreign 
agents into the system.  Mexican popular art was saved from oblivion in the 1920s when a 
major international exhibition of the Mestizo, native and colonial art of Mexico was held in 
Mexico City and Los Angeles, in concert with the publication of Las Artes Populares en 
México, prepared and edited by the well known Jaliscan muralist, Dr. Atl, a book which 
created an artistic « canon » for indigenous crafts and established their identity as works of art 
(Monsivais, 1996).  T&T capitalized on this revived recognition of the artistic value of their 
products.  Again in the 1950s, they were given a new boost when Jorge Wilmont from 
Monterrey and Ken Edwards from the USA (Romo, 1990) were both attracted by the rich 
pictural motifs in local pottery and linked them to foreign buyers. From there, Odilon Avalos 
from Puebla incorporated blown glass and new techniques of coloring the glass (Alvarez, 
1969) improved later by Camaraza; Sergio Bustamante drew on the Guadalajara gold jewelry 
traditions to bring jewelry and paper maché to the districts; new rustic hacienda furniture 
styles arrived via the Alfaro family from Nogales; and Luna and Figueroa subsequently 
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grafted new designs forms for urban residents in Mexico and abroad (Adobe Diseño); and 
ironwork was later added to the mix (Mercado, 2003), among other numerous contributions. 
Thus, each time demand shifts (fashions, foreign buyers, chain stores redefine their lines) it is 
worrisome, but the challenge has been met through artistic and stylistic product innovation. 
 This confidence is also the result of a very delicate balance between local solidarities, 
which act as shock absorbers when national and international forces push for change. 
Entrepreneurs know each other and identify with each other, both in Tonalà, where 
entrepreneurs often have worked together in firms, or even are members of the same or of 
linked families, and in Tlaquepaque, where they may emerge out of working for highly 
esteemed artists or may be members of the artistic community themselves. According to 
Mercado Martinez (1989), who classified the workshops into three categories – family, semi-
industrial, and industrial -- Tonalà's family workshops are on average 33 years old and some 
go back four generations; 54% of workers are the owners' children, 18% are their wives, and 
28% are brothers or other family members. The semi-industrialized workshops had an average 
age of 10 years, 80% were founded by the current owner, and employed an average of six 
workers. In this category one third of the workers are family members.   The industrial 
workshops average 17 years and employ 37 workers, with the largest counting 87 employees. 
Family members here work in administrative, management and supervisorial duties, and 
occasionally design, but not in direct production (Mercado Martinez, 1989).   Family 
members or other workers often are assisted in establishing their own firms and then work as 
contractors to the workshops  where they started out.  This system of spin-offs and 
subcontractors leads to extensive local knowledge-sharing.  But knowledge diffusion also 
comes about through common socialization, a shared culture which incorporates elements of 
indigenous, Mestizo and colonial aesthetics, as well as through local bridging via 
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intermediaries, between producers and designers, artists and artisans; this is a highly 
structured "society of communities." 
 The role of marketing intermediaries is critical in maintaining the community-society 
balance in T&T.  The intermediaries have one foot in the local community and another in the 
wider network of international markets, trade shows, and clientele.  But these intermediaries  
see themselves as part of the districts. Foreigners came to Tlaquepaque and Tonalà a number 
of decades ago.  A small number of North Americans, notably, were attracted to the area by 
its cultural and artistic traditions.  They became involved in working with local producers, 
helping them to reach North American and later, European markets.  Later on, this became a 
two-way street, where they brought back knowledge of markets that permitted local producers 
to adapt their products to be more suitable to those markets.  Over time, this behavior 
developed beyond a few maverick personalities into a stratum of intermediaries, who are very 
much analogous to the imprenditori found throughout the Third Italy.  Nowadays, they 
generate business for local producers, putting together the firms necessary to meet a particular 
order; some represent the districts in international trade shows, while others simply wait for 
the buyers to come to Jalisco, relying on established reputations. In any case, they bring the 
discipline of foreign prices and necessity to meet foreign quality standards and timing 
(Mercado, 2003). All is not rosy: there are occasional intermediaries who attempt to exploit 
the locals; interestingly, most of them are Mexican rather than foreign, seeing  the districts 
just a way to make products as cheaply as possible.  Here, again, there is a radical difference 
between our Mexican and Brazilian cases: in Brazil, intermediaries are almost always seen as 
opportunistic rent-earners who raise prices, and lower the efficiency of markets.  
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 Ethnic identities are also mobilized as community bonds. Indigenous communities 
have strong participation in certain regional production chains.19  There are many towns in 
Jalisco and Michoacán populated by  very small firms, who act as subcontractors to  larger 
firms in the Guadalajara metropolitan area.  Though there are latent ethnic tensions, the 
arrangements are relatively stable because they are collective in nature. Michoacán is full of 
towns specialized in distinctive crafts, the best known of which is Santa Clara de Cobre,  a 
town devoted to the production of copper products. These local communities are in turn 
linked to world markets through the markets of Tonalà and Tlaquepacque. 
 
4.2 HIERARCHICAL BUT STABLE DISTRIBUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 One of the most impressive aspects of Tonalà and Tlaquepaque is their “buzz,” the 
energy that one senses in being there, from the sheer amount and pace of work being done, 
from the conversations and exchanges occurring inside firms, on the streets, in front of juice 
and coffee stands, on streetcorners. Yet the buzz does not feel like pressure or exploitation, 
because the people involved have complex connections, through family, community, and 
previous work situations.   
This stands in marked contrast to the feeling one gets in so many places we visited in 
the Northeast of Brazil, which are of slowness and routine, even in the large factories where 
high output levels are expected of the wage workers. The level of entrepreneurship – in 
production and marketing – is high because there are reliable long-term payoffs to creating 
firms.   In part this has to do with the internal and external distributional arrangements of the 
districts.  Internally, as noted, many firms employ family members or people they know 
through community or family relationships.  This creates a certain flexibility in remuneration, 
so that when times are good, compensation is made for sacrifices that occur when times are 
                                                 
19 for an analysis of different types of production chains, see Polenske, 2001 
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bad.  In addition, family-based firms lower their costs through non-waged labor. At the same 
time, this gives individuals possibilities of long-term wealth accumulation that would not be 
possible were they merely wage laborers.  These distributional arrangements are also inter-
ethnic to some extent; as noted above, subcontracting extends from districts in Jalisco to 
certain villages in Michoacán and elsewhere which are essentially populated by indigenous 
peoples.  This gives them an economic base which, however subject to the harsh realities of 
fluctuating markets, is something that they rely on for their independence, a big incentive to 
keep at it. Societal forces also play a role in the achievement of this delicate distributional 
balance.  Local groups have access to local political power, but foreigners have access to 
markets: the dialogue between the two groups is key to achieving the mix of price-efficiency, 
quality-efficiency and sharing out of risks and benefits that creates incentives for everyone to 
keep trying.   
  In Tlaquepaque, there are numerous artists and artisans whose products give them 
international renown.  The economic rewards are considerable, but not such as to make others 
feel they are unattainable; the incentive effect is therefore quite strong.  In Tonalà, there are 
cases of firms growing to have relatively large production runs, mostly by supplying large 
foreign chains such as Pottery Barn or Pier One Imports. Once again, this is a contrast 
between our Mexican and Brazilian cases: in the Northeast, there is widespread fatalism about 
the possibility of serving international buyers, even in the shoe industry where an 
international clientele already exists, because it is taken for granted that Brazilian firms will 
soon lose out to the Chinese. 
  
4.3  PROBLEM-SOLVING AND ADJUSTMENT 
 Problem-solving is principally informal and “distributed” in nature; there are few 
formal organizations of local government and producers, and those that have been attempted 
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have more than often failed. For example the Instituto de la Artesanía Jalisciense, is a public 
agency for promoting Jalisco crafts,  but in practice has little role to play in the district.  The  
Casa de la artesanía de Jalisco,  a marketing branch of the Instituto, is  a rarely-visited crafts 
store somewhere in Guadalajara. Formal industry associations in Guadalajara have shown 
also weaknesses and  internal conflict, notably in the case of the jewelry association, which 
after recurrent scandals has not been able to generate a mechanism to assure the quality and 
metal content -gold and silver- in their members’ products. There are happy exceptions, and 
an important one of which is the furniture association of Jalisco.  After a long period of 
conflict, it has coalesced into the organizer of the most important furniture trade show  in 
Mexico. But it should equally be noted that formal organizations have the disadvantage of 
being identifiable by, and hence, subject to influence of dominant political parties, 
governments, and public bureaucracies, which generally limit their problem-solving capacities 
more than they enhance them.  Thus, rather than taking the form of formal developmental 
coalitions, the problem-solving activities of the districts are characterized by discussion 
between different agents in the system and consequent adjustment in firms. 
 The key linkage in making this happen is once again the intermediaries, who bring 
information about markets and products to local producers, and take information from local 
producers to wider markets.  This is where the “data” on problems comes from; it is the early 
warning system for local producers that problems may be coming, but it is also the early alert 
system that they may be on to something good.  The information gets distributed because the 
intermediaries are not producers themselves; they have no incentive to hoard information, but 
rather want to diffuse it in most cases.  But even among firms, there are incentives to diffuse, 
because of the system of production-sharing on one hand, and on mixed identities (artisans 
and owners are often former workers or family members).   
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 The one area in which formal coalitions are successful is that of urban planning and 
local development.  Tlaquepaque´s commercial districts, in conjunction with the local 
authorities have secured zoning for the integrated production and sales of crafts, art and 
connected services. They have also conserved  the architecture and urban amenities of a 
splendid colonial town, and this image is a key element in the promotion of the district and its 
products. The place-specific qualities of Tlaquepaque provides them the  symbolic and 
material infrastructure to and match them with tourists eager to find  high-quality, unique 
Mexican crafts --  and willing to pay for them.   Tonalá has used its urban space in a different 
way, more directly related to local social networks.  The tianguis secure high-cost scarce 
urban space for the smallest producers and distributors through the local government.  Thus, 
they effectively control who can enter the district and where they can locate, but also prevent 
the disintegration of the district due to scarcity of space.  The contrast to the towns we studied 
in Northeastern Brazil could not be more marked: workshops are crowded either into poorly 
maintained urban areas with crumbling infrastructure or in isolated, depressing industrial 
parks with dusty unpaved access roads and effectively no nearby services, and no integration 
between production, sales, and community life. 
 More generally, the nexus of design-oriented producers and intermediaries has been 
effective on a number of occasions in problem-solving.  In the 1970s, when times were 
difficult for the districts, Bustamante20 achieved better linkage between high-level foreign 
retailers and producers in Tlaquepaque, allowing the latter to raise average prices and save 
their businesses.  His example was followed by the Preciado family21 and by Agustín Parra22 
                                                 
20 Bustamante is an artist and artisan, known for his sculpture and jewelry, which are exhibited around the world.  
He is also the owner of a chain of galleries which sell his work in Mexico and abroad.  A detailed biography and 
catalog of his work may be found at www.sergiobustamante.com.mx
 
21 The Preciado family is one of the most visible artisan-entrepreneur groups in Tlaquepaque. They produce a 
wide variety of objects, ranging from wood furniture to decorative products.  They export a great deal and are 
present in many international shows. 
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and Rodo Padilla23, among others.  They concentrated on maintaining high quality, 
establishing recognizable personal styles, and creating an image associated with their names 
(a sort of trademark).  They did so in part by participating in national and international 
competitions, thus entering the art world.  In this way, they pushed up their market value,  
enabling them to earn profits well above the industry average.  In so doing, they had positive 
spillover effects on other, less well-known producers, who could raise their prices through the 
market’s association of them with the place and its style. Still, there is a long way to go.  
Producers complain that there is insufficient institutional incorporation of design.  They 
compare the treatment of design and designers in the Guadalajara area unfavorably to the 
institutional recognition of design in Italy or Catalonia; producers are said to want design 
without paying for it and without acknowledging it in an institutional sense. 
Current challenges are numerous.  Cheap imitations of Mexican-style products are 
fabricated in China.  An American consumer can buy a Chinese-imitation chimenea for her 
patio at K-Mart for $60.00, where the real product made in Tlaquepaque will cost five times 
as much.  There are quality differences, but there is no appellation d'origine controlée to 
clearly identify the real thing.  High-end products are subject to fashion changes and 
competition from European design-oriented firms.  There are ongoing, but informal attempts 
to face these challenges and to compose the coalitions that could do so.   A key aspect is the 
production and diffusion of design in the district. New generations of artisans other agents 
have backgrounds as professionally-trained designers; they are coming to the district and 
bring new ideas both for production, marketing and organization.  At the current time, they 
have complained of a lack of accurate information on external markets and their changing 
                                                                                                                                                        
22 Agustín Parra is a painter, sculptor, retablista and designer of high quality furniture and wood sculptures.  He 
is an entrepreneur with production facilities, as well as retail shops in Tlaquepaque and Guadalajara.  His work 
can be seen at www.agustinparra.com.mx
 
23  Specialist in ceramic figures and sculptures based on Mexican folklore :  www.rodopadilla.com
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fashions, and insufficient public and private support for design. All in all, problem-solving 
exists but all is not well and further attention to design upgrading is needed. 
 
5. EXPLAINING CONTRASTS IN DEVELOPMENT 
 Some might be tempted to reduce the differences between the Brazilian and Mexican 
cases analyzed here to their different colonial pasts and the social structures inherited from 
them, much in the same way that some have claimed that the successes of European industrial 
districts are due to their accretion of social capital over the very long-run (Putnam et al, 
1993).  But the cases at hand both share histories of colonization, with the attendant creation 
of colonial elites and disenfranchised masses.  There are important differences, in that in the 
Northeast slavery was pronounced and institutionalized and a slave population was imported 
from Africa, whereas in Jalisco and Michoacán, indigenous communities -- though strongly 
affected by the colonial and post-colonial epochs -- have survived.  Still, in both, strong 
mestizo cultures were generated; in both, colonial structures were not so different.   T&T have 
benefited from the revaluation of Mexican artistic traditions and from the small-firm 
industrial structure of the Guadalajara region, while the Northeast has suffered from the 
devaluation of its artistic traditions and from a long history of industrial policies in Brazil 
which emphasize large-firms, top-down policies, and the neglect, if not the active destruction, 
of communities. Brazilian national policies and societal dynamics have not only neutralized 
many of the intended positive effects of regional development policy, but have actively 
created blockages to regional development in the Northeast.  In the Mexican case, though 
national policies and forces have done relatively little good,24 they have been gotten around in 
                                                 
24  There have been no significant regional economic development plans for Jalisco state or the Guadalajara 
region.  In the case of Michoacan, a development pole was installed, in the form of a large steel meel and a port 
(the Las Truchas Project in Lazaro Cardenas), creating an isolated development enclave typical of such, largely 
failed, experiments.  Thus, the regions in question were much less the object of coordinated national 
development policies than was the Northeast of Brazil, with the SUDENE experiment. See note 10, above, for 
more information on the SUDENE regional development policy in Brazil. 
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many ways; and Jalisco has benefited from wave after wave of innovative, enthusiastic agents 
from outside the region, who have had the right ideas at the right time.  Still, they have also 
found fertile ground with which to implant those ideas and make them grow.  
 It should be clear, then, that societal and communitarian forces are the results of long 
pasts, but also are constantly evolving; they shape the incentives to act upon current 
information, market possibilities, and other resources which become available. Much 
contemporary regional development policy takes the operational level of  practices, routines, 
and institutions -- clusters, inter-firm relations, best practices, marketing -- as its direct target.  
Our analysis suggests that while these might be valuable benchmarking exercises, such 
operational aspects of economies only come about when underlying social forces generate 
incentives that encourage agents to make them happen.  Policy that focuses only on these 
observable intermediate outcomes of the development process is likely to fail.  The kind of 
policy that is likely to succeed will have not only short-term goals, but long-term structural 
effects on institutions, in the sense of changing expectations that underlie the coordination of 
economic agents so that different patterns of collective action can emerge. 
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APPENDIX: BASIC INDICATORS  
 Mexico   Jalisco   Michoacan   
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 
Firms(a) 131625 138835 344118 9902 10204 27784 5464 6996 19731 
Change N 
of firms 
 5.5 147.9  3.0 172.3  28.0 182.0 
Average 
firm 
size(a) 
20.5 19 12.3 17.1 17.2 11.7 6.2 8 4.2 
% firms 
less than 
10 W. 
81.2(b) 86.3 90.1 85.1(b) 80.5 87.2© 93.2(b) 94.4 96.6(d)
% firms 
less than 
100 W. 
93.3(a1) 96.2 98 95.7(a1) 97.3 98.5© 97.3(a1) 99.1 99.6(d)
Per capita 
income 
(GDP/pop) 
3343.5(x) 4088(e) 5371(f)  4082(e) 5305(f)  2051(e) 2947(f)
PCI as % 
of national 
PCI 
    99.9(g) 98.8  50.2(g) 54.9 
% product 
exported, 
region 
     36.8%(h)   7.1%(n)
% product 
exported, 
nation 
 3.97%(i)(j) 15.71%(i)   9.8%(h1)   0.6%(n)
          
Exports of 
goods and 
services 
         
as % of 
GDP 
6.9(k) 12.9%(l) 28.7%(m)       
 
a: Data for years 1980, 1988, 1998. Source: 1980, XI Censo Industrial. 1989, X Censo Económico. 1999, XII Censo Económico. 
a1: % of firms with wage workers. XI censo industrial INEGI 1980. 
b: Less than 25 workers % of firms with wage workers. XI censo industrial INEGI. 1980 
c: Data for year 1998, INEGI, Anuario estadístico Jalisco, edición 2000. 
d: Data for year 1998, INEGI, Anuario estadístico Michoacan, edición 2000. 
e: GDP data for year 1993. Population data for year 1995. Source: GDP, INEGI. Sistema de Cuentas Nacinales de México. Population 
data, Censos de Población y Vivienda, IEGI. 
f: Source: GDP, INEGI. Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de México. Population data, Censos de Población y Vivienda, INEGI. 
g: With data for 1993 
h: State GDP/state total exports. Source SEIJAL with data of BANCOMEXT, http://seprove.jalisco.gob.mx
h1: Total national exports/total state exports. Source SEIJAL with data of BANCOMEXT, http://seprove.jalisco.gob.mx
i: Manufacturing exports/manufacturing total production value. Manufacturing exports source: SHCP, Banco de México, Secretaría de 
Economía e INEGI. Production Value source: For 1990: INEGI. SCNM. Cuentas de Bienes y Servicios, 1988-1999. Aguascalientes, Ags., 
México, 2000. For 1999-2001: INEGI. SCNM. Cuentas de Bienes y Servicios, 1996-2001. Aguascalientes, Ags., México, 2003. 
j: The NAFTA comision for labor cooperation presents a number of 18.3% exports as % of the GDP. 
k: GDP data from world development report 1999/2000. Exports data from Banco de México. 
l: Data for 1994. OECD Main Economic Indicators, february 1996. 
m: OECD main economic indicators august 2002. 
n: Exports and GDP for year 1999. Source, Secretaría de Desarrollo Económico de Michoacán. 
x: GDP for year 1980 from OECD main economic indicators. March 2003. 
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 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000   
Firms(a) 1,088,918 1,428,368 2,238,687 107,555 140,578 288,998   
Total 
Employment (a) 20,492,131 23,198,656 26,216,463 3,134,418 3,670,857 4,374,850   
Average firm 
size(a) 18.8 16.2 11.7 29.1 26.1 15.1   
% firms less than 
10 W (a) 79.93 81.64 85.01 74.82 76.45 83.32   
% firms less than 
100 W (a) 97.42 97.86 98.61 95.97 96.59 98.12   
Monthly average 
working 
income(in 
minimum wages) 
(a) 
3.68 5.43 5.02 2.87 4.16 3.55   
Monthly average 
salary 
manufacturing (in 
minimum 
wages)(a) 
3.96 5.36 4.79 2.77 3.3 2.9   
Per capita income 
(GDP/pop) (b) 
3,236 3,116 3,400 © 1,527 1,744 2,038 ©
  
National GDP 
(billion US$) (a) 
(d) 
211 469,3 602,2     
  
Regional Share -
NE/National GDP 
(d)  
   14,10 (e) 12,86 13,09
  
% product 
exported, 
NE/Total exports 
(d)  
      28% 12% 7%
  
         
a) RAIS (for the 80's, data refers to the year 1985)      
b) SUDENE, SIG, 2003 - US$ 1999       
c) Year 1999         
d) Source: IPEA - apud IBGE, Contas Regionais do Brasil, 1985-2000. Micro-dados   
e) Year  1985         
 
